Is "Promotional Work" Considered "Sales" for Purposes of the FLSA's Outside Salesperson Exemption?

An employee is exempt from overtime pay under Section 13(a)(1) of the FLSA if he is an outside sales person.

This means:

  • His primary duty is making sales, or obtaining orders or contracts for services for the use of facilities for which a consideration will be paid by the client or customer; and
  • He is customarily and regularly engaged away from the employer’s place or places of business. 

Although the meaning of “making sales” may be intuitive to the layperson, its application under federal law is anything but clear. According to the U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division Fact Sheet #17F (“Wage and Hour Fact Sheet #17F”), “making sales” includes any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sales, shipment for sale, or other disposition.  It includes the transfer of title to tangible property, and in certain cases, of tangible and valuable evidences of intangible property. But this definition hardly ends the story. 

What if an employee works away from the office promoting his employer’s product but never actually consummates a sale? Is he still considered an outside salesperson under federal law? The short answer is: Yes and No. 

According to Wage and Hour Fact Sheet #17F, promotional work may or may not be exempt outside sales work, depending upon the circumstances under which it is performed.  If the promotional work performed is incidental to and in conjunction with an employee’s own outside sales or solicitations, it is exempt work.  If it is incidental to sales made, or to be made, by someone else, it is not exempt outside sales work.

For example, where an employee promotes a pharmaceutical product to a physician but can transfer the physician nothing more than free samples and cannot lawfully transfer ownership of any quantity of the drug in exchange for anything of value, cannot lawfully take an order for its purchase, and cannot even obtain from the physician a binding commitment to prescribe it, a court could conclude that no sale was made. See In re Novartis Wage and Hour Litig., 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 13708, at*34 (2nd Cir. 2010).

Wirtz v. Keystone, 418 F.2d 249, 260-61 (5th Cir. 1969) also found no outside salesperson exemption because student salesmen only obtained lists of persons who seemed receptive to the idea of purchasing magazine subscriptions, paving the way for student managers to subsequently take orders—student salesmen solicited orders from potential customers but were prohibited from collecting money and were instructed to turn over all order forms to student managers who would then contact the prospect, explain the payment plan and execute the contract.

Gregory v. First Title of America, Inc., 555 F.3d 1300, 1305-06 (11th Cir. 2009), however, decided that whether an employee was ever involved in the actual sale of title insurance to realtors, brokers and lenders, and end users was immaterial if the employee’s promotional efforts were directed toward the consummation of her own sales as opposed to stimulating the sales of the company in general. In other words, such an employee is exempt and will be charged with making a sale in some sense if she obtained commitments to buy orders and was credited with the sale even though she never directly sold title insurance to anyone because she was not licensed to do so. See also Marketing Executive Is Exempt Outside Salesperson Under FLSA, Says Eleventh Circuit, posted by Richard Tuschman on Epstein, Becker and Green's Wage and Hour Defense Blog.

Similarly, Brody v. Astrazeneca, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 107301, *26-27 (C.D. Cal. 2008) decided that if an employee’s promotional efforts are directed at persuading particular individuals to purchase a product rather than the general public and if he is compensated based on his success in securing purchases from individuals, he makes “sales” unlike promotional efforts directed to such tasks as setting up displays or posters, stocking store shelves, removing damaged or spoiled stock from shelves or rearranging merchandise, replenishing stock, and/or consulting with the store manager. See also Delgado v. Orth-McNeil, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 28810, *12-13 (C.D. Cal. 2009).

Even though these cases provide some foundation for wading through the factors necessary to ascertain whether a sale for purposes of the outside salesperson exemption was made, they are no substitute to uniform case law in a single jurisdiction on the issue. In fact, at least one Ninth Circuit court, D’este v. Bayer Corp., 565 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009), pointing out the dearth of California case law on the topic, requested additional guidance from the California Supreme Court on the matter. 

Notably, even though applying the factors discussed above may allow an employee to overcome the outside salesperson exemption through some characterization of the performance of his promotional work, the very same court highlighted that there is no guarantee that that employee’s promotional efforts, if significant to the company, will not fall within another overtime exemption, i.e., the administrative exemption. Id. 

Thus, with little guidance in this area, it is unclear (even after a review of the cases cited above) whether an employee performing promotional work of such importance (in California in particular) can still be classified as a non-exempt employee. This begs the question: Will an inquiry of the “promotional work” an employee does to overcome one exemption risk another? Maybe so. 

Ninth Circuit Rules Officers' Donning and Doffing Time is Not Compensable Under FLSA

On March 25, 2010, in a long awaited decision, the Ninth Circuit held that the time spent putting on and taking off required uniforms and gear does not constitute compensable work for police officers. In Bamonte v. City of Mesa (9th Cir. 08-16206) the claimants, police officers employed by the city of Mesa, Arizona, brought a suit contending that the City violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to compensate police officers for time spent putting on and taking off their uniforms and gear at the beginning and end of their shift, a process known as donning and doffing.  The police officers argued that strong relationship between their uniform and gear and the performance of their duties makes the time they spend putting the uniforms on and off compensable.  They further argued that, although they have the option of donning and doffing their uniform and gear at home, for many reasons it is preferable for police officers to do so at work. 

The Ninth Circuit disagreed.  It emphasized the fact that the police officers are not required by law or by the nature of their work to don and doff their uniforms and gear at the employer’s premises.  The Court reasoned that to the extent officers chose to dress at work, their decision was strictly a matter of employee convenience, and, as a result, their decision to change clothes at work did not render that time compensable. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s ruling that the donning and doffing of uniforms and gear by police officers is not compensable under the FLSA.

This decision may have significant ramifications for both private and public employers. To the extent any employer requires its employees to wear a uniform (or gear), this decision provides a framework for determining whether an employee is entitled to compensation. Although certain factors or set of facts may lead to variations, an employer requiring its employees to don and doff uniform and gear at work are likely required to compensate employees for that time, but employees are generally not entitled to compensation if they have the right to change at home at the beginning and end of their workday.

Are you truly an "independent contractor"?

Much of wage and hour class action litigation has concerned claims alleging that a group of employees is misclassified as exempt employees resulting in the employees not being paid overtime or subject to State meal and rest break requirements. Most of this litigation concerned claims involving the Executive and Administrative exemptions. Today, however, we see an increasing amount of litigation involving claims that workers have been misclassified as independent contractors when, in fact, they are employees. The rise in such claims is not surprising given the poor economic conditions over the past few years. Employers are under constant pressure to minimize labor costs. By treating a group of workers as independent contractors, companies save hundreds of thousands or, perhaps, millions of dollars because they no longer reimburse workers for out of pocket expenses necessary to perform the work and don’t pay overtime. Additionally, by treating these workers as independent contractors, corporations save by not having to pay ever-increasing costs of employee benefits, including health insurance and retirement benefits. But, the company sometime gets the independent contractor classification wrong.

When assessing whether workers are properly classified as independent contractors one must examine the applicable state of federal law. Most state law, including California, follows traditional agency law that focuses on the principal’s right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the workers desired result. Under this test, “if the employer has the authority to exercise complete control, whether or not that right is exercised with respect to all details an employer-employee relationship exists.” Empire Star Mines Co. v Cal. Emp. Com. 28 Cal. 2d 33, 43 (1946). Although the right to control remains a significant factor, a mulit-factor analysis is also utilized with the following issues considered: whether the person performing the services is engaged in an occupation or business distinct from the principal; whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the principal; whether the principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities and tools of work; the workers investment in the equipment or materials required by his task; the skill required of the particular occupation and whether it is usually done without supervision; the workers opportunity for profit or loss depending on his managerial skill; the duration of work and degree of permanence; the method of payment whether by time or on the job; and whether the parties believe they are creating an employee-employer relationship. S.G. Borrello & Sons, Inc. v Dept of Industrial Relations, 48 Cal. 3d 341 (1989). Virtually all contracts will designate the worker as an independent contractor and contain boilerplate language purporting to give the worker the right to control their work. However, the title of independent contractor does not govern but rather the true nature of the relationship controls.

Claims brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) apply a slightly different test. The definition of employee under the FLSA is particularly broad. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (noting that the FLSA “stretches the meaning of ‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency law principles”).To determine if a worker qualifies as an employee, the focus is on whether, as a matter of economic reality, the worker is economically dependent upon the alleged employer or is instead in business for himself. Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Serv., Inc., 161 F.3d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 1998). To aid in this inquiry, five non-exhaustive factors are considered: (1) the degree of control exercised by the alleged employer; (2) the extent of the relative investments of the worker and the alleged employer; (3) the degree to which the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss is determined by the alleged employer; (4) the skill and initiative required in performing the job; and (5) the permanency of the relationship. Id. No single factor is determinative. Brock v. Mr. W Fireworks, Inc., 814 F.2d 1042, 1043–44 (5th Cir. 1987). Rather, each factor is a tool used to gauge the economic dependence of the alleged employee, and each must be applied with this ultimate concept in mind. Id.

Therefore, it is critical for workers in an independent contractor arrangement to be alert that they may be employees under the law and entitled to protections afforded under the labor laws and to the same benefits that a principal affords its employees. Workers should not be fooled by boilerplate language in their contract but rather keep in mind the ways the principal has the right to control their work.