DOL Opinion Letters, A Thing of the Past?

For decades, wage and hour attorneys have relied on DOL Opinion Letters as a means for interpreting and applying the FLSA. In the past, requests for opinion letters could be submitted and would receive responses that analyzed the particular facts of any given situation. This practice is now a thing of the past, and wage and hour attorneys can no longer rely on these opinion letters to the degree they once did for the specific situations arising in their cases. 

The DOL has not issued an opinion letter with regard to the FLSA since early last year. At the time the last opinion letter was issued, the DOL also withdrew several of its previous opinion letters for what it described as further consideration. The DOL has since determined that it will not issue wage and hour opinion letters in the manner it has in the past, and will instead issue more broad Administrative Interpretations.


 

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Ninth Circuit Rules Officers' Donning and Doffing Time is Not Compensable Under FLSA

On March 25, 2010, in a long awaited decision, the Ninth Circuit held that the time spent putting on and taking off required uniforms and gear does not constitute compensable work for police officers. In Bamonte v. City of Mesa (9th Cir. 08-16206) the claimants, police officers employed by the city of Mesa, Arizona, brought a suit contending that the City violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to compensate police officers for time spent putting on and taking off their uniforms and gear at the beginning and end of their shift, a process known as donning and doffing.  The police officers argued that strong relationship between their uniform and gear and the performance of their duties makes the time they spend putting the uniforms on and off compensable.  They further argued that, although they have the option of donning and doffing their uniform and gear at home, for many reasons it is preferable for police officers to do so at work. 

The Ninth Circuit disagreed.  It emphasized the fact that the police officers are not required by law or by the nature of their work to don and doff their uniforms and gear at the employer’s premises.  The Court reasoned that to the extent officers chose to dress at work, their decision was strictly a matter of employee convenience, and, as a result, their decision to change clothes at work did not render that time compensable. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s ruling that the donning and doffing of uniforms and gear by police officers is not compensable under the FLSA.

This decision may have significant ramifications for both private and public employers. To the extent any employer requires its employees to wear a uniform (or gear), this decision provides a framework for determining whether an employee is entitled to compensation. Although certain factors or set of facts may lead to variations, an employer requiring its employees to don and doff uniform and gear at work are likely required to compensate employees for that time, but employees are generally not entitled to compensation if they have the right to change at home at the beginning and end of their workday.

Tips to Recognizing Wage and Hour Violations

This article is a great overview of some of the most common violations with respect to wage and hour laws.  They are more common than you might think, so protect yourself by knowing your rights.

The Top 7 Most Common Wage and Hour Mistakes

'Duplicative' Rite Aid OT Suit Survives Dismissal Bid

On March 24, Employment Law360 reported on Judge Paul G. Gardephe of the the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York and his decision to deny a request for dismissal from Rite Aid in the Naula et al v. Rite Aid of New York Inc. et al case. Rite Aid claimed the suit was duplicative to another suit, thus requesting for dismissal. KPA associate Matt Bailey is one of the lead attorneys representing the plaintiff and is quoted in the article.

Office Max Managers - You may be owed unpaid wages!

Current and past Office Max Managers may be owed unpaid wages if they were classified as a Manager and performed non-managerial duties more than 50% of the time.

All employees have enforceable rights and deserve to be paid fairly. 

KPA CAN HELP.  We are experienced in all aspects of employment law and have extensive knowledge in litigating employment-related claims such as employment discrimination and misclassification, and wage and hour violations.

 

If you, members of your family, or friends may have a claim, contact us immediately.

Read Robert Drexler's Article "The Fuzzy Line Between Merits and Class Certification Analyses"

An often-stated principle in class certification law is that the class certification motion is not a motion on the merits; the merits of the case are distinct from the analysis of the class certification requirements. However, in practice, the line between a class certification and merits is blurred. Two recent California Court of Appeal cases illustrate this point.

In Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd., 169 Cal. App. 4th 1524 (2009), the employee drivers filed a lawsuit challenging Diva’s policy of paying its drivers an hourly rate for assigned trips but failing to pay for on-call time between assignments, referred to as “gap” time. The trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion to certify two overlapping subclasses, one based on Diva’s alleged failure to pay earned overtime and straight time and a second targeting Diva’s failure to provide mandatory rest breaks. The denial focused on the potential difficulty of assessing the validity of Diva’s compensation policy in light of variations in how drivers spend their gap time. Diva had submitted numerous employee declarations stating that drivers typically used unpaid gap time for their own purposes such as working out at a gym, napping or eating at home or running personal errands. The trial court’s order denying certification, however, suggested that if plaintiffs’ claims are valid, class treatment of those claims is appropriate, but stated that the court must first determine if Diva’s practices are improper and, if so, which drivers fit into the appropriate class.

Read the remainder of Robert's article as published in the January KPA Newsletter here.

Are you truly an "independent contractor"?

Much of wage and hour class action litigation has concerned claims alleging that a group of employees is misclassified as exempt employees resulting in the employees not being paid overtime or subject to State meal and rest break requirements. Most of this litigation concerned claims involving the Executive and Administrative exemptions. Today, however, we see an increasing amount of litigation involving claims that workers have been misclassified as independent contractors when, in fact, they are employees. The rise in such claims is not surprising given the poor economic conditions over the past few years. Employers are under constant pressure to minimize labor costs. By treating a group of workers as independent contractors, companies save hundreds of thousands or, perhaps, millions of dollars because they no longer reimburse workers for out of pocket expenses necessary to perform the work and don’t pay overtime. Additionally, by treating these workers as independent contractors, corporations save by not having to pay ever-increasing costs of employee benefits, including health insurance and retirement benefits. But, the company sometime gets the independent contractor classification wrong.

When assessing whether workers are properly classified as independent contractors one must examine the applicable state of federal law. Most state law, including California, follows traditional agency law that focuses on the principal’s right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the workers desired result. Under this test, “if the employer has the authority to exercise complete control, whether or not that right is exercised with respect to all details an employer-employee relationship exists.” Empire Star Mines Co. v Cal. Emp. Com. 28 Cal. 2d 33, 43 (1946). Although the right to control remains a significant factor, a mulit-factor analysis is also utilized with the following issues considered: whether the person performing the services is engaged in an occupation or business distinct from the principal; whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the principal; whether the principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities and tools of work; the workers investment in the equipment or materials required by his task; the skill required of the particular occupation and whether it is usually done without supervision; the workers opportunity for profit or loss depending on his managerial skill; the duration of work and degree of permanence; the method of payment whether by time or on the job; and whether the parties believe they are creating an employee-employer relationship. S.G. Borrello & Sons, Inc. v Dept of Industrial Relations, 48 Cal. 3d 341 (1989). Virtually all contracts will designate the worker as an independent contractor and contain boilerplate language purporting to give the worker the right to control their work. However, the title of independent contractor does not govern but rather the true nature of the relationship controls.

Claims brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) apply a slightly different test. The definition of employee under the FLSA is particularly broad. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (noting that the FLSA “stretches the meaning of ‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency law principles”).To determine if a worker qualifies as an employee, the focus is on whether, as a matter of economic reality, the worker is economically dependent upon the alleged employer or is instead in business for himself. Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Serv., Inc., 161 F.3d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 1998). To aid in this inquiry, five non-exhaustive factors are considered: (1) the degree of control exercised by the alleged employer; (2) the extent of the relative investments of the worker and the alleged employer; (3) the degree to which the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss is determined by the alleged employer; (4) the skill and initiative required in performing the job; and (5) the permanency of the relationship. Id. No single factor is determinative. Brock v. Mr. W Fireworks, Inc., 814 F.2d 1042, 1043–44 (5th Cir. 1987). Rather, each factor is a tool used to gauge the economic dependence of the alleged employee, and each must be applied with this ultimate concept in mind. Id.

Therefore, it is critical for workers in an independent contractor arrangement to be alert that they may be employees under the law and entitled to protections afforded under the labor laws and to the same benefits that a principal affords its employees. Workers should not be fooled by boilerplate language in their contract but rather keep in mind the ways the principal has the right to control their work.
 

Important News for Current or Past Rite Aid Pharmacy Managers or Assistant Managers

Current and past Rite Aid Pharmacy employees might be owed unpaid wages if they:

  • Worked off the clock, or
  • Were classified as an exempt manager or assistant manager and performed primarily non-managerial duties.

All employees have enforceable rights and deserve to be paid fairly.

KPA CAN HELP.

If you, members of your family, or friends might have a claim, contact us for a free consultation.

Khorrami Pollard & Abir LLP, one of the largest plaintiff-only firms in the nation, represents individuals in a variety of cases including class actions, pharmaceuticals, product liability, natural disasters, toxic torts, and labor and employment matters.

 

Study Finds a Majority of Employees Have Been Denied Proper Pay

A recent study based on workers in Los Angeles, New York, and Chicago found that low-wage workers are routinely denied proper overtime pay and are often paid less than the minimum wage. In addition, at least 68% of workers interviewed had experienced at least one pay-related violation in the previous workweek. This study, the most comprehensive examination of wage-law violations in a decade, demonstrates how important California’s wage and hour laws are.

Of particular note, the study revealed that women were far more likely to suffer minimum wage violations than men, with female illegal immigrants suffering the most. Among American-born workers, African Americans had a violation rate nearly triple that for whites.

According to the study, employees are losing $51 a week, of the average weekly earnings of $339. That is a great deal of money to someone living at or below the poverty level, and demonstrates how important it is that workers know their rights. For example, how many workers know they are entitled to time and a half if they work over 8 hours in one day or 40 hours in one week? And if they work off the clock, do they know they are entitled to pay for that time worked, or do they think it is just another “policy” that they have to endure?

This study demonstrates that workers need advocates to stop hold employers liable for wage and overtime violations.   

The Price of the Robe, Too Little or Too Much?

In my relatively new legal career I have only had one opportunity to argue in front of a federal court judge and I remember the experience vividly. That being said, it shouldn’t come as a surprise that when I saw his picture in the news recently it grabbed my attention. However, after reading the article I realized that the first time I had argued in front of Judge Stephen G. Larson would also be my last. Judge Larson has announced that he will be stepping down on November 2, 2009 to enter the private practice.

The reason for this move…the $169,000 salary.

Judge Larson is one of a number of judges from the Central District of California to step down for financial reasons. From 1998 to August 2009, seven federal district court judges have stepped down for higher pay.Some even stepping down to state judicial positions, which apparently consist of a higher salary.

Although his salary may seem pretty high compared to what the average Californian makes, in the legal world, not so much. I have friends and colleagues who were getting paid the same if not more than that in their first and second years out of law school. Some, ironically, from firms like O’Melveny & Myers, where Judge Larson started his legal career at.  

It seems that the prestige and honor that comes with being appointed a District Court judge sometimes fades when the reality of the monetary value put on that appointment kicks in. It seems to beg the question of whether this would deter people who otherwise would be wonderful assets to the bench from ending up there, or in the alternative, remaining there.

Brother Can You Spare a Dime: Court Rejects Chase Bank's Claim that New York Law Does Not Require the Payment of Overtime Compensation to Hourly Employees

On September 4, 2009, New York District Court Judge, Hon. Roslynn R. Mauskopf, rejected efforts by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("Chase") to disavow the existence of the New York State regulation empowering its hourly paid employees to receive overtime compensation.  (Andrade v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80836 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2009)).  Chase’s argument, which sought to set employee rights back 100 years to the era of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), asserted that hourly employees in New York could claim overtime compensation under New York State law only if the employee had personally negotiated such a right with financial behemoth Chase by way of contract.  The Lochner decision – which invalidated early efforts by the States to regulate sweatshop-like working conditions during the industrial revolution – reduced employee protections solely to the right of contract under a pro-business judicial philosophy that was subsequently abandoned in the post Depression era.  In modern times, however, Chase’s claim insisting that New York does not have a mandatory overtime law is an extreme, if not outrageous, proposition.  This fact was underscored by Judge Mauskopf, who reasoned that “the cases recognizing the validity of New York's overtime regulation are legion.” See Andrade, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80836, at 5-7, n.1. Thus, the Andrade decision reflects a victory for New York hourly employees who are entitled by law to receive overtime compensation for going the extra mile to generate profits for their corporate employers.

The Pursuit of PAGA: Does the Named Plaintiff Have and Obligation to Bring PAGA Claims on Behalf of an Employment Class After Arias v. Superior Court?

For some time a proposition has been bandied about the California class action community concerning whether counsel in a wage and hour class action litigation should assert PAGA (“Private Attorney General Act of 2004”) penalty claims on behalf of the class as a matter of course. Proponents of this position have maintained that litigation of the underlying wage violation itself bars subsequent litigation of PAGA claims under principles of res judicata, and as such, the named plaintiff in wage and hour class litigation should affirmatively plead and prosecute PAGA penalty claims on behalf of the class to preserve the right to recover penalties.

This view was seemingly gaining traction earlier this year when the Second District Court of Appeal held that PAGA penalty claims may be barred on res judicata grounds, even if not pled in the prior litigation. (Deleon v. Verizon Wireless, 170 Cal. App. 4th 519, 531 (2008), rev. granted by Deleon v. Verizon, 94 Cal.Rptr.3d 322 (Cal., May 13, 2009)). As reasoned by the Deleon Court, a PAGA penalty claim is not an action on behalf of the State, and as such, may be waived by an employee if not affirmatively pled and litigated. 

However, Deleon’s analysis seems to have taken a major hit in light of the California Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Arias v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 969 (2009). While the Arias Court concluded that actual litigation of a PAGA claim is binding on all interested parties (including both employees and the State), the Arias Court seemingly knocked out the fundamental premise of the Deleon Court’s holding by concluding that “an action to recover civil penalties ‘is fundamentally a law enforcement action designed to protect the public and not to benefit private parties.’” (Arias, 46 Cal. 4th at 986).  This conclusion – which is supported by the fact an employee plaintiff may bring the action only after giving written notice to the Workforce Development Agency – draws into doubt whether a PAGA action and the underlying wage violation involve the same “primary right.” If this is the case, then it logically follows that a PAGA claim would not be subsequently barred if not asserted on behalf of the class in the complaint.

Putting this issue aside, however, the premise that PAGA penalty claims will increase overall recovery to class members is currently a dubious proposition. For example, in the context of a class settlement, the requirement that 75% of PAGA penalties recovered be paid to the State paradoxically places pressure on class counsel to minimize the amounts apportioned to a PAGA claim to fulfill his or her fiduciary duty of maximizing recovery to the class. As no definitive standards currently exist to evaluate the subsequent apportionment of settlement funds between compensation for PAGA penalties and wages paid to the class for the underlying wage violations (Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(l)), counsel in many cases have successfully obtained approval of settlements allocating only a nominal fraction of the overall recovery to a PAGA claim. Were a mechanical pro-rata apportionment between the value of the penalty claims and the value of the underlying wage claims at issue applied, inclusion of a PAGA claim in many cases could stand as a losing proposition for members of the class – especially in settlements where only limited funds are on the table to resolve all claims.  Under such circumstances, it is conceivable that the class may benefit more by not mixing PAGA claims with claims to recover wages.

In sum, even if the Deleon Court’s res judicata analysis can survive Arias – which seems unlikely – the ultimate impact of including a PAGA claim in light of the statue’s vague enabling provisions presents more questions than answers. As such, the issue of whether inclusion of a PAGA claim will ultimately benefit the class in the long run remains an open question.

 

The "Nature of the Work" Catch-22: Using the Meal Period Exemption to Establish a Policy of Refusing Access to Rest Breaks

In the world of wage and hour class action litigation, employers are increasingly seeking to use the “on-duty” meal break exemption as a waiver defense to the action. Yet, employers who seek to defend a meal break class action by such means not only ensure a basis for class-wide adjudication of meal period claims [See Bufil v. Dollar Financial Group, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 4th 1193 (2008)], they may be unwittingly setting up an argument for class adjudication of rest periods claims as well.

An on-duty meal break is a codified exception to the requirement that “off-duty” meal breaks be given, and may be utilized by the employer “onlywhen the nature of the work prevents an employee from being relieved of all duty ….” See e.g. 8 CCR 11040(11)(A). “The test of whether the nature of the work prevents an employee from being ‘relieved of all duty’ is an objective one” [DLSE Enforcement Manual, at § 45.2.3.1], and is focused on the employer’s business “overall.” See West v. Circle K Stores, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42074, 14 (E.D. Cal., 2006). 

In light of the forgoing standards, an employer who advocates that it was entitled to invoke the on-duty meal break exemption based on the nature of its work by necessity must make an admission that common impediments existed that precluded free access to all breaks – including rest periods.  This admission is material – not only because the on-duty exemption applies only to meal periods, but also because the existence of a common barrier provides a basis for class adjudication of a rest period claim.

Thus, the astute class advocate should use the “on-duty” exemption to the employee’s advantage. An employer cannot have it both ways. An employer who claims the “nature of the work” precludes access to meal periods may not defeat class certification of rest period claims by arguing it is not an insurer of breaks. Under most circumstances, the employer’s effort to avail itself of the “on-duty” exemption all but ensures that rest break claims will be amenable to class adjudication as well.