New York Times Editorial Weighs in on the Groundbreaking Wal-Mart Employment Class Action

An editorial run online yesterday at nytimes.com as well as in print in today's New York Times, addresses Wal-Mart's pending petition for Supreme Court review of the 9th Circuit's April ruling affirming class certification of the largest employment class in U.S. history. The class is comprised of over 1 million women who have worked for Wal-Mart,  the nation's largest private employer,  throughout the last decade, and allege they have experienced ongoing gender discrimination in relation to equal pay and promotions.

The editorial notes that seeking Supreme Court review is likely a savvy legal move by Wal-Mart given the Supreme Court's tendency to show favor to large corporations, while also opining that a full hearing of Wal-Mart's allegedly discriminatory employment practices is in order. Thus far, the battle between the behemoth corporation and the class has  been strictly limited to whether class treatment is appropriate, and sadly it remains to be seen whether the underlying merits of the plaintiffs' claims will ever be heard on a class-wide basis.

Tips to Recognizing Wage and Hour Violations

This article is a great overview of some of the most common violations with respect to wage and hour laws.  They are more common than you might think, so protect yourself by knowing your rights.

The Top 7 Most Common Wage and Hour Mistakes

Office Max Managers - You may be owed unpaid wages!

Current and past Office Max Managers may be owed unpaid wages if they were classified as a Manager and performed non-managerial duties more than 50% of the time.

All employees have enforceable rights and deserve to be paid fairly. 

KPA CAN HELP.  We are experienced in all aspects of employment law and have extensive knowledge in litigating employment-related claims such as employment discrimination and misclassification, and wage and hour violations.

 

If you, members of your family, or friends may have a claim, contact us immediately.

Read Robert Drexler's Article "The Fuzzy Line Between Merits and Class Certification Analyses"

An often-stated principle in class certification law is that the class certification motion is not a motion on the merits; the merits of the case are distinct from the analysis of the class certification requirements. However, in practice, the line between a class certification and merits is blurred. Two recent California Court of Appeal cases illustrate this point.

In Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd., 169 Cal. App. 4th 1524 (2009), the employee drivers filed a lawsuit challenging Diva’s policy of paying its drivers an hourly rate for assigned trips but failing to pay for on-call time between assignments, referred to as “gap” time. The trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion to certify two overlapping subclasses, one based on Diva’s alleged failure to pay earned overtime and straight time and a second targeting Diva’s failure to provide mandatory rest breaks. The denial focused on the potential difficulty of assessing the validity of Diva’s compensation policy in light of variations in how drivers spend their gap time. Diva had submitted numerous employee declarations stating that drivers typically used unpaid gap time for their own purposes such as working out at a gym, napping or eating at home or running personal errands. The trial court’s order denying certification, however, suggested that if plaintiffs’ claims are valid, class treatment of those claims is appropriate, but stated that the court must first determine if Diva’s practices are improper and, if so, which drivers fit into the appropriate class.

Read the remainder of Robert's article as published in the January KPA Newsletter here.

Are you truly an "independent contractor"?

Much of wage and hour class action litigation has concerned claims alleging that a group of employees is misclassified as exempt employees resulting in the employees not being paid overtime or subject to State meal and rest break requirements. Most of this litigation concerned claims involving the Executive and Administrative exemptions. Today, however, we see an increasing amount of litigation involving claims that workers have been misclassified as independent contractors when, in fact, they are employees. The rise in such claims is not surprising given the poor economic conditions over the past few years. Employers are under constant pressure to minimize labor costs. By treating a group of workers as independent contractors, companies save hundreds of thousands or, perhaps, millions of dollars because they no longer reimburse workers for out of pocket expenses necessary to perform the work and don’t pay overtime. Additionally, by treating these workers as independent contractors, corporations save by not having to pay ever-increasing costs of employee benefits, including health insurance and retirement benefits. But, the company sometime gets the independent contractor classification wrong.

When assessing whether workers are properly classified as independent contractors one must examine the applicable state of federal law. Most state law, including California, follows traditional agency law that focuses on the principal’s right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the workers desired result. Under this test, “if the employer has the authority to exercise complete control, whether or not that right is exercised with respect to all details an employer-employee relationship exists.” Empire Star Mines Co. v Cal. Emp. Com. 28 Cal. 2d 33, 43 (1946). Although the right to control remains a significant factor, a mulit-factor analysis is also utilized with the following issues considered: whether the person performing the services is engaged in an occupation or business distinct from the principal; whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the principal; whether the principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities and tools of work; the workers investment in the equipment or materials required by his task; the skill required of the particular occupation and whether it is usually done without supervision; the workers opportunity for profit or loss depending on his managerial skill; the duration of work and degree of permanence; the method of payment whether by time or on the job; and whether the parties believe they are creating an employee-employer relationship. S.G. Borrello & Sons, Inc. v Dept of Industrial Relations, 48 Cal. 3d 341 (1989). Virtually all contracts will designate the worker as an independent contractor and contain boilerplate language purporting to give the worker the right to control their work. However, the title of independent contractor does not govern but rather the true nature of the relationship controls.

Claims brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) apply a slightly different test. The definition of employee under the FLSA is particularly broad. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (noting that the FLSA “stretches the meaning of ‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency law principles”).To determine if a worker qualifies as an employee, the focus is on whether, as a matter of economic reality, the worker is economically dependent upon the alleged employer or is instead in business for himself. Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Serv., Inc., 161 F.3d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 1998). To aid in this inquiry, five non-exhaustive factors are considered: (1) the degree of control exercised by the alleged employer; (2) the extent of the relative investments of the worker and the alleged employer; (3) the degree to which the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss is determined by the alleged employer; (4) the skill and initiative required in performing the job; and (5) the permanency of the relationship. Id. No single factor is determinative. Brock v. Mr. W Fireworks, Inc., 814 F.2d 1042, 1043–44 (5th Cir. 1987). Rather, each factor is a tool used to gauge the economic dependence of the alleged employee, and each must be applied with this ultimate concept in mind. Id.

Therefore, it is critical for workers in an independent contractor arrangement to be alert that they may be employees under the law and entitled to protections afforded under the labor laws and to the same benefits that a principal affords its employees. Workers should not be fooled by boilerplate language in their contract but rather keep in mind the ways the principal has the right to control their work.
 

California Supreme Court Holds That Earned Wages Can Be Transformed Into Unvested Future Compensation in Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc.

On November 2, 2009, the California Supreme Court issued an opinion in Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc., __ Cal.4th __ (2009), holding that an employment incentive provision calling for the forfeiture of restricted company stock if the employment relationship was terminated before vesting did not run afoul California Labor Code sections 201, 202, and 219. The Court’s opinion turned largely on the conclusion that the employee had voluntarily entered into the Plan, which provided employees with shares of restricted company stock at a reduced price in lieu of a portion of the participating employee’s annual cash compensation. According to the Court, the employee was not entitled to return of monies paid into the Plan in exchange for the unvested company stock at the time of termination because the employee had renegotiated the terms of employment by entering into the Plan, and had received the benefits promised by the employer (i.e. the restricted company stock).

In light of the Court’s decision, an employee must be mindful in when agreeing to trade vested compensation (i.e. compensation already earned) for future unrealized compensation such as restricted stock.

Further discussion of this case may be found at the Bailey Class Action Daily.
 

Law360.com Reports on the KPA Regelman v. Level 3 Communications LLC Employment Case

The Law360.com employment article “Analyst Wins Conditional Cert. in L-3 FLSA Dispute” reports on the recent conditional collective certification by the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania in the case of Regelman v. Level 3 Communications LLC. Khorrami Pollard & Abir LLP and Pogust Braslow & Millrood LLC represent plaintiff Rose Regelman in the case, accusing Level 3 Communications LLC of allegedly misclassified analysts as exempt from federal overtime pay regulations.

Read the entire article by visiting Law360.com.

Study Finds a Majority of Employees Have Been Denied Proper Pay

A recent study based on workers in Los Angeles, New York, and Chicago found that low-wage workers are routinely denied proper overtime pay and are often paid less than the minimum wage. In addition, at least 68% of workers interviewed had experienced at least one pay-related violation in the previous workweek. This study, the most comprehensive examination of wage-law violations in a decade, demonstrates how important California’s wage and hour laws are.

Of particular note, the study revealed that women were far more likely to suffer minimum wage violations than men, with female illegal immigrants suffering the most. Among American-born workers, African Americans had a violation rate nearly triple that for whites.

According to the study, employees are losing $51 a week, of the average weekly earnings of $339. That is a great deal of money to someone living at or below the poverty level, and demonstrates how important it is that workers know their rights. For example, how many workers know they are entitled to time and a half if they work over 8 hours in one day or 40 hours in one week? And if they work off the clock, do they know they are entitled to pay for that time worked, or do they think it is just another “policy” that they have to endure?

This study demonstrates that workers need advocates to stop hold employers liable for wage and overtime violations.   

Brother Can You Spare a Dime: Court Rejects Chase Bank's Claim that New York Law Does Not Require the Payment of Overtime Compensation to Hourly Employees

On September 4, 2009, New York District Court Judge, Hon. Roslynn R. Mauskopf, rejected efforts by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("Chase") to disavow the existence of the New York State regulation empowering its hourly paid employees to receive overtime compensation.  (Andrade v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80836 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2009)).  Chase’s argument, which sought to set employee rights back 100 years to the era of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), asserted that hourly employees in New York could claim overtime compensation under New York State law only if the employee had personally negotiated such a right with financial behemoth Chase by way of contract.  The Lochner decision – which invalidated early efforts by the States to regulate sweatshop-like working conditions during the industrial revolution – reduced employee protections solely to the right of contract under a pro-business judicial philosophy that was subsequently abandoned in the post Depression era.  In modern times, however, Chase’s claim insisting that New York does not have a mandatory overtime law is an extreme, if not outrageous, proposition.  This fact was underscored by Judge Mauskopf, who reasoned that “the cases recognizing the validity of New York's overtime regulation are legion.” See Andrade, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80836, at 5-7, n.1. Thus, the Andrade decision reflects a victory for New York hourly employees who are entitled by law to receive overtime compensation for going the extra mile to generate profits for their corporate employers.

Employees Beware: What You Say on Social Networking Sites May Have Implications at Work

On Tuesday, ABC News reporter Terry Moran posted a message to his Twitter account that President Obama had called Kanye West a “jackass” for interrupting Taylor Swift’s acceptance speech at the MTV Video Music Awards on Sunday.  The problem was that the comment was made during an off-the-record discussion between Obama and a correspondent for CNBC.  Although Moran removed the message within an hour, with over one million followers, the news quickly spread on Twitter. 

The bigger story has not been Obama’s comment about Kanye West, but rather, journalistic standards and the use of social networking sites.  During a meeting on Tuesday, ABC News President David Westin reminded staff to follow editorial standards before sharing information on social networking sites.  An ABC spokesman said, “One of the lessons learned here is that when somebody who is well-known to the news audience tweets something, even on a private Twitter account, it has the same impact almost as ABCNews.com publishing it.”

Whether “well-known” or not, when an employee writes something on a social networking site, that message can have repercussions at work.

A study released in September 2008 showed that more than one in five employers use social networking sites in screening job applicants.  One-third of those employers had rejected a candidate based on what they found on a social networking site.

Additionally, many companies are adopting written policies regarding social networking sites for their employees and may take disciplinary action against those whose postings cast the company in a negative light.  Thus, employees must be aware that they may be held accountable at work for what they say and do on social networking sites – even if it is done on their own time and on their own computers.

The Pursuit of PAGA: Does the Named Plaintiff Have and Obligation to Bring PAGA Claims on Behalf of an Employment Class After Arias v. Superior Court?

For some time a proposition has been bandied about the California class action community concerning whether counsel in a wage and hour class action litigation should assert PAGA (“Private Attorney General Act of 2004”) penalty claims on behalf of the class as a matter of course. Proponents of this position have maintained that litigation of the underlying wage violation itself bars subsequent litigation of PAGA claims under principles of res judicata, and as such, the named plaintiff in wage and hour class litigation should affirmatively plead and prosecute PAGA penalty claims on behalf of the class to preserve the right to recover penalties.

This view was seemingly gaining traction earlier this year when the Second District Court of Appeal held that PAGA penalty claims may be barred on res judicata grounds, even if not pled in the prior litigation. (Deleon v. Verizon Wireless, 170 Cal. App. 4th 519, 531 (2008), rev. granted by Deleon v. Verizon, 94 Cal.Rptr.3d 322 (Cal., May 13, 2009)). As reasoned by the Deleon Court, a PAGA penalty claim is not an action on behalf of the State, and as such, may be waived by an employee if not affirmatively pled and litigated. 

However, Deleon’s analysis seems to have taken a major hit in light of the California Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Arias v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 969 (2009). While the Arias Court concluded that actual litigation of a PAGA claim is binding on all interested parties (including both employees and the State), the Arias Court seemingly knocked out the fundamental premise of the Deleon Court’s holding by concluding that “an action to recover civil penalties ‘is fundamentally a law enforcement action designed to protect the public and not to benefit private parties.’” (Arias, 46 Cal. 4th at 986).  This conclusion – which is supported by the fact an employee plaintiff may bring the action only after giving written notice to the Workforce Development Agency – draws into doubt whether a PAGA action and the underlying wage violation involve the same “primary right.” If this is the case, then it logically follows that a PAGA claim would not be subsequently barred if not asserted on behalf of the class in the complaint.

Putting this issue aside, however, the premise that PAGA penalty claims will increase overall recovery to class members is currently a dubious proposition. For example, in the context of a class settlement, the requirement that 75% of PAGA penalties recovered be paid to the State paradoxically places pressure on class counsel to minimize the amounts apportioned to a PAGA claim to fulfill his or her fiduciary duty of maximizing recovery to the class. As no definitive standards currently exist to evaluate the subsequent apportionment of settlement funds between compensation for PAGA penalties and wages paid to the class for the underlying wage violations (Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(l)), counsel in many cases have successfully obtained approval of settlements allocating only a nominal fraction of the overall recovery to a PAGA claim. Were a mechanical pro-rata apportionment between the value of the penalty claims and the value of the underlying wage claims at issue applied, inclusion of a PAGA claim in many cases could stand as a losing proposition for members of the class – especially in settlements where only limited funds are on the table to resolve all claims.  Under such circumstances, it is conceivable that the class may benefit more by not mixing PAGA claims with claims to recover wages.

In sum, even if the Deleon Court’s res judicata analysis can survive Arias – which seems unlikely – the ultimate impact of including a PAGA claim in light of the statue’s vague enabling provisions presents more questions than answers. As such, the issue of whether inclusion of a PAGA claim will ultimately benefit the class in the long run remains an open question.

 

The "Nature of the Work" Catch-22: Using the Meal Period Exemption to Establish a Policy of Refusing Access to Rest Breaks

In the world of wage and hour class action litigation, employers are increasingly seeking to use the “on-duty” meal break exemption as a waiver defense to the action. Yet, employers who seek to defend a meal break class action by such means not only ensure a basis for class-wide adjudication of meal period claims [See Bufil v. Dollar Financial Group, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 4th 1193 (2008)], they may be unwittingly setting up an argument for class adjudication of rest periods claims as well.

An on-duty meal break is a codified exception to the requirement that “off-duty” meal breaks be given, and may be utilized by the employer “onlywhen the nature of the work prevents an employee from being relieved of all duty ….” See e.g. 8 CCR 11040(11)(A). “The test of whether the nature of the work prevents an employee from being ‘relieved of all duty’ is an objective one” [DLSE Enforcement Manual, at § 45.2.3.1], and is focused on the employer’s business “overall.” See West v. Circle K Stores, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42074, 14 (E.D. Cal., 2006). 

In light of the forgoing standards, an employer who advocates that it was entitled to invoke the on-duty meal break exemption based on the nature of its work by necessity must make an admission that common impediments existed that precluded free access to all breaks – including rest periods.  This admission is material – not only because the on-duty exemption applies only to meal periods, but also because the existence of a common barrier provides a basis for class adjudication of a rest period claim.

Thus, the astute class advocate should use the “on-duty” exemption to the employee’s advantage. An employer cannot have it both ways. An employer who claims the “nature of the work” precludes access to meal periods may not defeat class certification of rest period claims by arguing it is not an insurer of breaks. Under most circumstances, the employer’s effort to avail itself of the “on-duty” exemption all but ensures that rest break claims will be amenable to class adjudication as well.

Age Discrimination: U.S. Supreme Court Raises Evidentiary Bar

Billie Burke:

“Age is something that doesn’t matter, unless you are a cheese.”

The U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in Gross v. FBL Financial (2009) 129 S.Ct.2343; 174 L.Ed.2d 119 which changes the burden of proof in age discrimination cases. Courts previously used Title VII’s burden of proof-shifting analysis when analyzing age discrimination (ADEA) cases. Title VII cases are “mixed motive” cases wherein the employee presents evidence that an employer’s adverse decision was motivated, in part, by unlawful discrimination even if the employer was motivated by other, lawful reasons. In cases based on alleged Title VII violations, an employee presented direct evidence that the employer’s adverse employment decision was partly motivated by unlawful employment discrimination (race, sex, religion, national origin), then a shift of the burden of persuasion occurred wherein the employer has the burden of proof, not the employee, that the employer would have made the same adverse decision absent the alleged unlawful discrimination.

Gross utilized the burden of proof shifting approach as had been previously used in mixed motive cases, but the U.S. Supreme Court declared that said method was improper for ADEA cases, because the ADEA statute was worded differently than Title VII. In 1991, Title VII was amended to specify that an employee could prevail in an employment discrimination case by showing that an improper discriminatory purpose was a “motivating factor” in the employer’s decision to demote or terminate. The Court determined that the language of the amendment did not extend to the ADEA statute, and the “mixed motive” methodology of proof did not apply to ADEA cases.

The present criteria for proof in an ADEA case is that an employee must prove that age was the “but for” cause of the employer’s action or decision. The plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that age was the determining factor in the employer’s employment decision.

The Court’s decision in Gross caught legal pundits by surprise because the issue was not briefed nor argued before the Court. The issue before the Court was whether or not an employee must present direct evidence in order to obtain a mixed motives jury instruction, but the Court declared that such an instruction was not appropriate in an ADEA case.

Many in the legal community regard the Gross decision to be the most significant employment law case in 2009, because it makes it more difficult for an employee to prevail on an age discrimination claim because of the comparatively high “but for” causation standard.

Gross is considered to be a major victory for employers. However, the decision may galvanize Congress to formulate legislation which is directly responsive to the Gross decision and an aging population where individuals are forced to work longer because of the uncertainty of social security.

California Courts Continue to Whittle-Down Employee Rights to Tips

On June 2, 2009, the California Fourth District Court of Appeal overturned an $86 million dollar judgment against Starbucks for alleged tip-pooling violations. The Court’s decision, styled Chau v. Starbucks, 174 Cal. App. 4th 688 (2009), concluded that Starbucks baristas failed to prove that Starbucks’ “tip pooling” practices violated California law. Under California law, management is generally prevented from sharing in the tip proceeds of employees. (Labor Code § 351). The Court reasoned that this did not occur in this case because shift supervisors, a job position below assistant manager, performed the same work as baristas and were an intended recipient of customer tips that were deposited into a common tip box.   Significantly, the Court acknowledged that the outcome may have been different had Starbucks permitted store managers and assistant managers to take a share in the tips.

The Court’s ruling in Chau, which is the third appellate decision this year to have applied a limited construction of California’s tip statute, provides no clear solutions for the approximately 120,000 California Starbucks baristas who rely on gratuities as a substantial portion of their income. Presently, the fate of the tip statute itself hangs in the balance, as the California Supreme Court has taken up the issue of whether Labor Code section 351 even provides employees a private right of action against their employers for improperly withholding tip proceeds. See Lu v. Hawaiian Gardens Casino, Inc., 170 Cal. App. 4th 466 (2nd Dist. 2009), review granted on April 29, 2009 (Supreme Court Case No. S171442); Grodensky v. Artichoke Joe's Casino, 171 Cal. App. 4th 1399 (1st Dist. 2009), review granted on June 24, 2009 (Supreme Court Case No. S172237). Depending on how the Supreme Court rules on this question in the negative, California employees could be dependent on the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (the state agency charged with enforcing section 351) for vindication of their rights, absent amendment of the statute by the Legislature.