California Bankruptcy Court Declares Defense of Marriage Act Unconstitutional

Lawfully married same-sex couple, Gene Balas and Carlos Morales, were victorious on Monday when the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California ruled against the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).   After Balas was laid off from his 200K/year job in March of 2009, he and Morales filed a joint petition for chapter 13 bankruptcy.  All of their property was community property and all of their debt was community debt.  The United States Trustee moved to dismiss the case pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 1307(c) based on DOMA, asserting that the Debtors are ineligible to file a joint petition because the Debtors are two males. 

Judge Thomas Donovan ruled that DOMA "deprives [the debtors] of the equal protection of the law to which they are entitled" and that there is “no valid governmental basis for DOMA.”  In an unusual move, 19 of Judge Donovan’s 23 colleagues on the country’s largest consumer bankruptcy court signed on to the opinion in support of the decision.   While this decision is only limited to bankruptcy proceedings, it sends a strong message and could serve as a model ruling for other jurisdictions where same-sex marriage is legal.

Corporations Do Not Have Privacy Rights

Today's decision in FCC v. AT&T relieves many concerns that the Supreme Court would further bring corporations' rights in line with personal protections.

Last year in Citizen United, the Court overturned restrictions on corporate campaign spending holding that they violated the First Amendment.  The decision to give corporations the same right as individuals to influence the electoral process was highly criticized by many, including President Obama, and ignored 200 year old case law stating that corporations are artifical entities, not people, subject to government oversight and limited to the powers attributed to them.  (Head & Armory v. Providence Ins. Co.)

AT&T involved a request from CompTel, a trade association representing some of AT&T's competitors, for documents that AT&T filed with the FCC.  AT&T wished to withold these documents by applying exemption 7(c) in the Freedom of Information Act relating to law enforcement records, the disclosure of which "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."  If the Court held that corporations were allowed to use this exemption, the decision would have a chilling effect on what is available to journalists and other researchers. 

However, in a unanimous decision today, the Court held that corporations do not have the right to personal privacy and thus cannot withhold documents filed with the government from pubilc disclosure. 

AT&T's argument to include corporations within the exemption was a linguistic one.  It argued that since Congress had previously defined "person" to include corporations, then "personal" should also include corporations.  The Court did not agree with this simplistic arguement and noted that the word "personal" does not necessarily derive from "person."

The Court pointed out that although nouns typically reflect their related adjective, this is not always the case. For example, the noun “crab” refers to a crustacean and a type of apple, while the related adjective “crabbed” can refer to handwriting that is “difficult to read,” “corny” can mean “using familiar and stereotyped formulas believed to appeal to the unsophisticated,” which has little to do with “corn,”  Likewise, “personal” does not simply mean “pertaining to a particular person.” 

AT&T also attempted to argue that “personal privacy” simply referred to the privacy of a person. However, breaking up the two words ignores the fact that words together can assume a particular meaning than when in isolation. 

The Supreme Court concluded that AT&T's interpretation conflicts with the common usage of the term "personal" and ultimately held that Congress intended the personal privacy exemption to apply to invdividuals, not corporations.  This grammatical distinction will keep corporations' rights limited, for now.

 

The Health and Privacy Risks of Airport Full-Body Scanners

Full Body ScannerOn Christmas Day 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab boarded Northwest Airlines Flight 253 bound for Detroit from Amsterdam. He planned to detonate plastic explosives hidden in his underwear, but the explosives failed to detonate, and Abdulmutallab was subdued by other passengers and the crew. Numerous red flags should have prevented Abdulmutallab from boarding a commercial airplane, but he was nearly able to kill the 289 people aboard that flight. The lasting legacy of the Underwear Bomber is not a total revamp of Transportation Security Administration (TSA) procedures or the disciplining of numerous people who allowed this situation to occur—it is the widespread adoption of the full-body scanner at airports. Due to the possible health concerns and serious privacy invasion by these scanners, many people have objected to their use.

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Read Galorah Keshavarz's Article "Inmates Continue to Endure Constitutional Violations While California Struggles with Prison Reform"

The United States Constitution acts to guarantee fundamental rights concerning conditions of confinement and treatment for all criminal defendants sentenced to U.S. prisons. Pursuant to the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, individuals convicted of a crime have the right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment while in prison. While no universal definition exists of what constitutions “cruel and unusual” punishment, it is settled that any punishment that is clearly inhumane or that violates basic human dignity may be deemed “cruel and unusual.” Typically, an inmate’s Eighth Amendment complaint regarding punishment and confinement conditions are brought in connection with federal civil rights laws, including the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. §3626, and 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Continue reading Galorah's article as published in the January KPA Newsletter here.

Freedom Has Its Rewards!!!!

Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded a decision rendered by the United States District Court for the Central District of California in Talamantes v. Leyva. .  Plaintiff, formerly a jail inmate, sought review of a judgment from the United States District Court for the Central District of California which dismissed his 42 U.S.C. §1983 action against defendant Los Angeles County, the sheriff’s department, and other employees and officials, on the grounds that  the plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (hereinafter PRLA) under U.S.C. § 1997e(a)

Plaintiff had been held in the county jail for eight weeks. He alleged that certain events violated his constitutional rights, and he filed a complaint more than one year after his release from the county jail. The district court held that Plaintiff was required to exhaust his remedies under U.S.C.S. §1997e (a) even though he was no longer in custody.

The Ninth Circuit, however, found that the plain and unambiguous language of the statute made it clear that the exhaustion requirement applied only to “prisoners.” “It is well settled that in a statutory construction case, analysis must begin with the language of the statute itself; when the statute is clear, ‘judicial inquiry into [its] meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished.” United States v. Carter, 421, F.3d 9-09, 911 (9th Cir. 2005), quoting Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., (1992) 505 U.S. 469, 475, 112 S.Ct. 2589, 120 L.Ed.2d 379. The PLRA provides that: "No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. §1983 or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C.1997e(a). The Court joined its sister circuits and held that only individuals who were prisoners as defined by §1997e (h) at the time the lawsuit is filed were required to comply with the exhaustion requirement of U.S.C.S. §1997e (a).

At least for individuals on parole, the often daunting provisions of the PRLA as to exhaustion of internal grievance remedies are now sidelined by the ruling of the Ninth Circuit. Prisoners complained of grievance complaints being lost, destroyed or ignored during the grievance and appeals procedures of the prison and were frustrated leading them to give up on the process. Parolees no longer have to deal with the bureaucratic process, unless Congress decides to change the rules.